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Abstract 
The principal of horizontal equity can be interpreted as requiring that households 
with the same pre-transfer incomes and the same consumption needs should receive 
the same post-transfer incomes. We argue the generosity of government financial 
support to families with children should be analysed with respect to such a baseline. 
Although not without problems, equivalence scales form an important part of such a 
procedure. The comparison of financial support to families with children with a 
corresponding equivalence scale, both over time and between countries, should give a 
more accurate picture of generosity than comparisons of cash values alone. We 
discuss potential advantages and drawbacks of such comparisons, illustrating with 
comparisons of the US and UK systems. The main drawback is that we can only 
evaluate the generosity of support for children relative to that for adults. With  this 
restriction, horizontal equity is more likely to be achieved for couples with 1 child 
than for those with 2 children. For some groups, the US  is more generous to children 
(relative to adults)  than the UK, but this difference is partly generated by the US 





The provision of financial support to families with children has become an 
important area of applied welfare policy analysis as a result of increasing 
interest in a number of areas. These include concerns about child poverty, the 
effects on expenditures of differences in the allocation of household resources 
across household members, and an increasing understanding of potential labour 
market incentive effects for those with childcare responsibilities. As a result 
there has been an increasing focus of the comparison of various systems for 
provision of financial support for children, either across countries, across time, 
or across proposals for reform. This paper discusses methodological factors that 
arise when thinking about comparing the nature and generosity of government 
support for families with children.  
 
  The first step is to define what me mean by “government financial support 
for children”. We are thinking of government financial support for children as 
the amount of financial support (we discuss later the difference between 
support delivered through tax cuts, cash payments or benefits-in-kind) that a 
family with children would not receive if it did not have any children. We 
abstract from the question of who in the family would actually receive the 
payments, and we accept that there may be no link between this support and the 
well-being of children. This concept might be explained more accurately as 
“government financial support to parents in respect of their children” but we 





        -page 3 
 
  So, with these definitions, an initial comparison might compare social 
assistance or tax rules in different countries or in the same country over time. 
As these undoubtedly would vary by income, it would be natural to plot the 
value of child-related payments made to families with children as they vary 
with gross household income. 
2 Such a comparison, for the US and UK (with 
monetary values adjusted using 2000 PPP rates) is presented in Figures 2 & 3, 
which show both the nature and amounts of support at different points in the 
income distribution (simplified, as these have necessarily been drawn for 
particular family types, but bringing out the main features). A different, but 
related comparison, is to look at budget constraints – the relationship between 
gross and net income – for families with children as gross income varies. This 
is presented in Figure 1. A number of recent studies have used such methods of 
comparison for the value of financial support for children (Battle and 
Mendelson, 2001, Brewer, 2001, and Brewer and Gregg, 2001). Such methods 
typically underlie claims that policy reforms are either more or less ‘generous’ 
to families with children. 
 
  Whilst interesting in their own right (and we present a short summary 
along these lines in what follows) such comparisons leave out three potentially 
important differences between systems, each of which might affect the 
conclusions of the comparison, depending on the particular aims of the 
comparative exercise itself. First, the costs of children may be different in the 
two regimes being compared, such that an equal financial transfer in each 
regime would lead to a differential change in welfare. Second, the distribution 
of income (and the joint distribution of income and children) may be different 
across the two regimes, such that unweighted comparisons across all income 
points would not necessarily reflect average outcomes. Finally, there may be 
other factors  differentially associated with the presence of children in the two 
regimes (or differentially compensated-for in the two regimes) such that 
differences in payments earmarked as child-related may not fully reflect 
differences in total payments to families with children (although the way one 
should treat such co-varying payments is a non-negligible issue in itself for the 
comparative exercise). An example might be housing tenure.  Of course, not all 
of these issues are always relevant, depending on the nature of the investigation 
                                                       
2 We say this is a natural comparison, but it is only natural under the maintained 
assumption that the presence of children is an exogenous factor, which we discuss 
further later.  
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in question. International comparisons, or comparisons of the same country in 
two time periods that are separated by a number of years, would clearly be 
affected by all three. On the other hand, when discussing potential effects of 
alternative reforms in a particular country at a particular time, it is less clear 
that such issues matter, although an understanding of the joint distribution of 
income and children is certainly useful in focussing debate. 
 
  In this paper, we discuss ways of controlling for each of the above factors 
when comparing the generosity of financial support for households with 
children. Throughout, we take the comparison of the US and the UK tax and 
transfer systems in 2000-01 as an illustrative model through which to discuss 
the issues that arise. We key point is that the generosity of support for children 
should be understood with respect to a non-zero baseline transfer, thus 
allowing the researcher to control for payments to children made solely as part 
of the redistribution taking place within the system as a whole. That is, we aim 
to separate the components of transfers to children that arise because children 
are often in households that are poor from those transfers that arise simply 
because the household has children. By estimating the part of the transfer 
system that is designed to achieve horizontal equity and subtracting this from 
child-related payments one is left with a measure of how much support to 
children within any particular system goes further than – or falls short of – this 
horizontal equity benchmark.  
  
  Section II outlines the methodology for comparison in more detail. Put 
simply, our methodology is first to calculate, for all possible values of pre-
transfer income, the difference in state support for households that are identical 
in all dimensions other than the number of children. We then compare these 
differences to equivalence scales which estimate the relative costs of children at 
similar levels of income. The particular choice of equivalence scale capturing 
the costs of children is clearly an important part of our analysis, and we discuss 
estimates of equivalence scales in the UK and the US, including a simple scale 
estimated on a comparable basis from comparable micro-data in each country. 
Since this is inevitably a problematic area (as we show), we also use the scales 
implicit in construction of government statistics on the income distribution or 
poverty line as a measure of official or semi-official stance on the relative 
needs of households with and without children.  
 
  It is important to stress that we are not directly comparing the generosity 
of the total level of support for a family with children in each country. Our 
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children,  and how, if at all, it varied by family income, so we compare the 
additional support for children relative to the support given to adults to the 
costs of children relative to adults. Our results can be reversed throughout, of 
course, and presented as how support for adults relative to children compares to 
estimates of the costs of adults relative to children.  
 
  In Section III we provide background to our applied analysis by first 
outlining the transfer programmes for families with children in the US and UK, 
and then using the Institute for Fiscal Studies’ micro-simulation model to 
calculate the extra financial support received by families in the UK across the 
income distribution. We do the same for a (simplified) version of the US tax 
and welfare system in 2000. We go on to discuss this financial support within 
the framework outlined in Section II. In Section IV we compare the various 
profiles of financial support for children with the appropriate equivalence 
scales for each country and deal with the issue of differences in the distribution 
of income (and covariates) across the two countries. We argue that these 
comparisons demonstrate the degree to which governments are moving away 
from, or towards, a pure horizontal equity principle when they are designing 
financial support for children. They can tell us whether particular groups of 
families with children are being relatively over- or under-compensated for the 
children. Because there are many equivalence scales that we could have chosen 
for this analysis, we explore the corollary by estimating what equivalence 
scales are implied by the different regimes of financial support for children.  
Finally, Section V concludes. 
 
 
II. THE RELATIVE GENEROSITY OF FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR 
CHILDREN 
 
An important guiding principle in social security design issues is the pursuit of 
horizontal equity: households that are the same in a particular set of dimensions 
of interest should be treated similarly (see Musgrave, 1959,  or Atkinson, 1980, 
for more detailed discussion). For the purposes of this paper, our interpretation 
of this principle is that households with the same pre-transfer incomes and the 
same consumption needs should receive the same post-transfer incomes. 
Importantly, this is not a principle concerned with children in particular – it is 
about raising the incomes of all poor households having controlled for their 
consumption needs. Of course, households with children tend to do quite well  
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out of this guiding principle, as they often have lower incomes, other things 
being equal, than those without, presumably because of the limitations children 
place on labour supply (Brewer et al, 2001 and DWP, 2001 show the position 
of households with children in the UK’s income distribution). That this 
principle is accepted by governments across the world is seen in the number of 
social security and tax systems that depend upon family and household 
characteristics as well the income of individual: we do not think of 
redistribution in terms of simply taking money from individuals with high 
incomes and giving it to those with low incomes – it involves a sense of “need” 
as well. The next section therefore discusses ways of understanding differences 
in consumption needs across households, and presents some important scales 
summarising relative needs in the US and UK, which will turn out to be 
important for the analysis of later sections. 
 
II.1 Equivalence scales and household needs 
 
To the extent that governments choose to redistribute towards households with 
children, then at least part of this redistribution will be on horizontal equity 
grounds – households with children have lower incomes and, more importantly, 
higher needs. There has been a formal recognition amongst economists of the 
differing needs of households with children for many years, dating back to the 
beginning of the century (Engel, 1895, and Rowntree, 1901). As a result, a 
number of techniques have been developed to facilitate the measurement of the 
economic costs of children. Such costs are traditionally summarised as an 
equivalence scale, defined as the cost to a household of achieving some 
particular standard of living, given its demographic composition, with this cost 
being expressed in comparison to the costs that a “reference household” would 
incur in achieving that same standard of living. The reference household is 
usually taken to be a married couple without children or a single childless 
adult.  Such a scale could then be used to convert a household comprising a 
certain number of adults and children into a household of  “equivalent adults”, 
and the number of equivalent adults can then be used to deflate household 
incomes or expenditures for comparison with the rest of the population on a 






r is some reference utility 
level, h
r is a reference household and h
1 is a different household type, and c(.) 
is the household cost function.  
 
  One issue becomes immediately clear, and this concerns whether such 
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between, the two cost functions. Comparing ratios of costs implies that one is 
using some constant proportion of household expenditure as a measure of the 
cost of a child, so that a child will cost a rich family more than it will cost a 
poor family. A specification that compared differences of costs would, 
however, imply that the cost of a child was fixed (in money terms), no matter 
what the income of the household. The most common approach is the ratio 
approach, and when considering the degree of horizontal inequity in pre-
transfer incomes in a population it seems preferable. In this approach, the 






r).  If one simply intends to 
compensate households in poverty for the presence of children then the 
`minimum cost' of a child can be constructed by making a judgment regarding 
the minimum level of adult expenditure and then calculating the implied 
compensation from equivalence scale ratios estimated at this level of 
expenditure.
 Alternative measures of the minimum cost of children, such as 
Parker (1999), can be made by adding up the cost of the minimum 
requirements that are deemed necessary for supporting a child, but we do not 
deal with such estimates of the cost of children in the application here , 
although our methodology could be easily applied using such scales.  
 
  Of course, this analysis is traditionally concerned only with the direct 
(financial) costs of children – those that arise through the necessity of spending 
more in order to reach the same standard of living. The true costs of children 
may be higher or lower. Further costs arise from loss of earnings whilst adult 
household members are out of the labour market, but rather than consider this, 
the focus of what follows will be on relative living standards given a certain 
level of household primary income. In addition, there is little doubt that the 
majority of adults who have children will have made a conscious decision to 
have them and no doubt derive utility from their presence. The economist 
cannot measure this latter welfare gain and hence it is traditionally  ignored in 
the computation of scales, although such omissions are important when 
focusing on the identification of equivalence scales, as pointed out by Pollak 
and Wales (1979). Ignoring the parents’ welfare gain from having children is 
somewhat unsatisfactory, but we would argue that there is a sense in which this 
potential welfare gain is not the most important issue when thinking of 
financial support at the bottom of the income distribution which is where, in 
practical policy terms, equivalence scales are most relevant. We have also only 
considered household utility, and paternalistic governments may care about the  
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utility of a child independent from its parents; this provides a further 
justification for not focusing on the welfare gains accruing to the parents.  
 
  There are a number of equivalence scales traditionally used to adjust 
household incomes in applied social security policy or policy analysis. The 
most simple adjustment perhaps, proposed and used by the OECD, is simply to 
adjust the number of household members according to the raw number of 
adults and children, regardless of age. Thus one scale would count the first 
adult as 1, subsequent adults as 0.7 and children as 0.5, meaning that a 
household with two adults and two children would be deemed to need 2.7 
times as much disposable income as a household with one adult only. Such 
scales typically pick up the majority of variation in needs and yet are not be 
sufficiently detailed for our purposes, which relate to the finer details of social 
security systems. More relevant to us are the scales which are most commonly 
used to analyse poverty and income inequality in the UK and US — referred to 
as the McClements and Orshansky scales respectively — which we present in 
Table 1 and Table 2 below. 
3 As is clear, such scales allow the relative 
consumption ‘needs’ of children to depend on their age, and represent more 
detailed adjustments to household needs to those cited above. Indeed, both 
scales have been used as an explicit part of the transfer systems in each country 
at some stage. Several US programmes use the official poverty thresholds – and 
therefore the equivalence scale implicit in the Orshansky scale – to determine 
eligibility (see, for example, Tables 7.1 and 7.2 in Citro and Michael, 1995). In 
the UK, the McClements scale was originally used (in the late 1970s) to help 
structure safety-net benefits, but the UK has gradually moved away from this 
scale since then (see Figure 3 in Banks and Johnson, 1992 and Table 3.2 in 
Brewer et al, 2001) although the scales are still used for official inequality 
measures (such as DWP, 2001).  
 
  One further piece of analysis is worth documenting at this stage. To 
control for the fact that relative consumption needs may have changed over 
time, or may be picked up in differential ways by these two policy scales 
(which are, after all, estimated by different methodologies) one can estimate a 
simple set of equivalence scales from directly-comparable data using a directly-
comparable methodology in both the US and the UK. Using survey data on 
                                                       
3 The US poverty thresholds are based on work by Millie Orshansky in the 1960s, 
and the poverty thresholds vary by household composition. Although a formal 
equivalence scale does not underlie the variations in the thresholds, one is implied, 
and it is this that we refer to as the Orshansky scale (Citro and Michael, 1995, 
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household budgets and household demographic variables, taken from the 1998 
UK Family Expenditure Survey and the 1998 US Consumer Expenditure 
Survey, we estimate a simple set of Engel equivalence scales for each country 
allowing different relativities according to marital status and the number of 
children, but without allowing for differences across the ages of children.
4 This 
is in accordance with the social security systems we analyse in later sections, 
where age-related components are not typically an important feature. These 
scales are presented in Table 3. The main difference between the scales is that 
our Engel scales give a higher weight to children, particularly compared to the 
McClements scale in the UK. Our Engel scales also show evidence of 
economies of scale in household expenditure (the second child adds less to the 
estimated equivalence scale than the first), a feature which is not found in the 
McClements scale, and not found consistently in the Orshansky scale. 
Interestingly, on average the scales suggest higher costs of children in the US, 
particularly for couples with three or more children, and single adults with two 
or more children. 
  
  The discussion at the start of this section makes clear that an equivalence 
scale is designed to capture precisely the variation in household needs that is 
required in order  to adjust post-transfer incomes of the population to ensure 
horizontal equity as we have defined it. Another way of thinking about this 
issue in an internationally-comparative context is as a way of adjusting for the 
fact that families with children do not consume the average bundle of goods, 
and hence do not consume the bundle of goods implicit in PPP comparisons. 
Furthermore, the effects possibly differ across countries depending on the 
structure of spending patterns and relative prices.The summary scales presented 
                                                       
4 An Engel scale is predicated on the assumption that the proportion of a 
households expenditure allocated to food is a good proxy for their welfare. By 
estimating the statistical relationship between spending on food, total spending or 
income, and household demographic variables, one can evaluate the amount of 
income one would need to give to a household of a particular type in order to bring 
its food spending into line with the reference household. It is well known that an 
Engel scale overestimates the costs of children, due to within household budgeting 
reasons (see Deaton (1997), p. 254, for example). However, we choose to use it 
since this will mean that, if anything, our estimates of the relative generosity will be 
underestimates. Results from the estimation process in each country are available 
from the authors on request.  
 
 
              - page 10 -   
also show (small) differences between our two countries in the way in which 
such adjustments need to be made.  
 
II.2 Efficiency gains 
 
In addition to redistribution there are other principles that might lead 
governments to direct money explicitly at families with children, as opposed to 
households that have low incomes relative to their needs. In recent years, the 
UK government has given more increasing attention to an efficiency argument 
— that society has an interest in the outcomes for (poor) children over and 
above the parents’ own interest. This has come about in the light of strong 
evidence that children who grow up in low-income families are more likely 
than better-off children to be unemployed, to be low skilled, to be unhealthy, to 
commit crime and to be a teenage parent in adulthood (see Hobcraft, 1999,  
Gregg and Machin, 2000a&b, or Bradshaw, 2001, for the evidence, and HM 
Treasury, 1999 or 2001, for the  UK’s policy towards this).  Most of these 
outcomes will impose costs for society in future years both in terms of tax 
revenue (through foregone growth) and in terms of extra spending on health, 
law and order, and social security. Similarly, governments may also wish to 
favour explicitly certain types of families with children over those without 
children (for example, the US supports married couples over cohabiting 
couples), or they may want to adopt explicit pro-natalist policies (see Milligan, 
2000, for example).  Finally, policy-makers may also care about possible work 
incentives when structuring financial support for families with children, 
particularly with regard to child-care related payments (see Blundell and 
Hoynes, 2001, and Brewer, 2001, who both compare financial work incentives 
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II.3 Other issues 
 
One problem that confronts all governments that want to help children is that 
governments cannot directly affect children’s own incomes, nor can they even 
be sure that increasing incomes in families with children will help children’s 
well-being.  In fact, although there is a great deal of evidence that links 
deprivation as an adult to growing up in a low-income family (references cited 
above), there is little UK evidence yet on what impact increasing incomes 
through extra government transfers has upon children’s well-being. Even if low 
incomes are linked with adverse outcomes, it need not be the case that 
increasing family income will improve these outcomes – there may be some 
hidden factor that is producing the apparent causation (for example, parental 
characteristics may lead both to higher parental incomes and better child 
outcomes). Or, if parents are altruistic and already spending the optimum 
amounts on their children, then extra resources will not benefit the children at 
all. 
 
  Two recent UK studies also show how the link between family incomes 
and child poverty, even just at the budgeting level,  may be more complex than 
first thought. Middleton et al (1997) look at patterns of spending on over 1,000 
children and show that children in low-income households have broadly similar 
amounts of money spent on them as children in (slightly) higher-income 
households, but parents in low-income families are much more likely to go 
without essentials – even regularly skipping meals in some cases – than parents 
in higher-income families. Gordon et al (2000) examine poverty defined in 
terms of a lack of necessities, and show that children in low-income households 
were less likely to go without essentials than adults in low-income households. 
Both of these results suggest that parents tend to protect their children from the 
effects of low incomes by making sacrifices themselves. If this is happening, 
then increasing the amount of money going to low-income families with 
children may help the parents more than the children. This discussion helps 
explain why governments provide a great deal of support and assistance for 
children through public services as well as through income transfers. It is 
beyond the scope of this paper, though, to attempt to identify the total value of 
government help for children. Hence, in subsequent sections, we will focus on 
the appropriate level of financial transfers through the tax and benefit system, 
taking the current provision of public services to families with children as 
given. But it is important to bear in mind that governments seek to achieve  
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horizontal equity goals through provision of benefits in kind or services, which 
might be skewed towards children or the poor.  
 
 
III. FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR CHILDREN IN THE UK AND US 
 
Both the UK and the US governments support families with children in a 
variety of ways. The financial costs of children are recognized in both 
countries: in the benefit system, though in-work refundable tax credits, and by 
non-refundable tax credits or extra tax deductions or allowances. However, the 
vagaries of perception and political economy mean that these support systems 
are often presented from very different perspectives, and in consequence can be 
difficult to compare.  
 
  Figure 1 compares the full budget constraint—the relationship between 
pre-transfer income and income after taxes and benefits and welfare 
payments—for families with children in the UK and US in 2000. The US 
system has been necessarily simplified: these figures do not include state taxes, 
state earned income tax credits (EITCs) or Medicaid; we include Food Stamps 
and we have assumed the TANF system operating in Florida, a relatively low-
benefit state. 
5 Housing support and help with childcare costs are ignored in 
both countries. The UK’s system looks more generous than the US at lower 
incomes in that, for a given PPP-adjusted pre-transfer income level and family 
composition, PPP-adjusted incomes after transfers are higher in the UK.
6 The 
transfer system as a whole is also more redistributive among families with 
children in the UK, with higher net tax rates at higher PPP-adjusted incomes 
than the US. A striking feature of both countries’ structures of support for 
children is their complexity, as different programmes with different rules apply 
to families at different incomes. 
7 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
  
 
                                                       
5 TANF benefits vary by family type and by state – see  Committee on Ways and 
Means, 2000, p. 384. 
6 The PPP rate used for conversion was the 2000 OECD rate of 0.665. 
7 This complexity is one of the reasons behind the UK Government’s proposed 
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Identifying financial support for children 
 
Figure 1 showed the full budget constraint for families with children in the US 
and the UK, and Figures 2 & 3 show the financial support provided for 
children by plotting the cash difference in the budget constraints of a couple 
with no children and a couple with a child. This way of identifying support for 
children is used by Ellwood and Liebman (2000), who look at the tax treatment 
of US families with children, by Battle and Mendelson (2001), who compare 
systems of support in the UK, US, Australia and Canada, and by Brewer and 
Gregg (2001) who compare the UK with the US. The calculation assumes full 
take-up of all transfer programs (which requires the assumption that families 
comply with maximum resource limits or work requirements), and we further 
assume continual employment year-round to enable us to convert weekly 
systems (means-tested benefits and national insurance contributions in the UK) 
and monthly systems (Food Stamps and TANF in the US) into annual amounts. 
There is a  implicit assumption, too, that that the distribution of gross income, 
the presence of children, and the structure of the transfer system are all 
exogenous to each other. For a summary description of the relevant 
programmes in each country see Appendix A; more detailed descriptions can 
be found in Battle and Mendelson (2001) and Brewer (2001), which survey 
both countries; or Ellwood and Liebman (2000), which looks at the US tax 
system; or Brewer, Myck and Reed (2001), and Brewer and Gregg (2001), 
which look at the UK.   
 
[Figures 2 & 3 about here] 
 
  One might expect support for children to decline monotonically with pre-
transfer family income: it does not. In the UK, there is a substantial increase in 
financial support for children at pre-transfer incomes of around £3,100, beyond 
which it falls as income rises.
8 The spike is due to the Working Families’ Tax 
Credit: although it contains a basic credit and per child credits, only those with 
children (or a disability) can apply, so the basic credit is really just an extra 
payment for the first child for non-disabled adults. Support for the first child 
ranges from £40.85 a week for the poorest to £15 for the richest, but the WFTC 
                                                       
8 Entitlement to the WFTC depends upon weekly hours worked, so we have had to 
assume a wage rate, and have chosen the minimum wage (£3.70 from October 
2001), so that entitlement to the WFTC occurs as the lowest possible income level.   
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provides £89.40 a week at the maximum point. The US system does not 
continuously decrease with income either. First, complex interactions between 
TANF and Food Stamps, the different eligibility rules for people with and 
without children , and the phase-in of the EITC, give a range where support is 
broadly flat for those on the lowest incomes. Second, after the EITC has been 
phased out, the value of the child exemptions and the head of household filing 
status increase with income. A particularly striking feature of the US system is 
the trough after the EITC has been withdrawn and before the tax allowances 
and deductions increase in value (from around $50,000), discussed more in 
Ellwood and Liebman (2000).  
 
  The figures have been drawn with PPP-comparable income levels, and an 
eyeball comparison shows that both countries are about equally-generous to 
children at low-incomes. At higher incomes than shown on the Figures, or for 
lone parents or families with more than 1 child, the US is more generous to 
children in higher-income families. We argue, however, that this provides a 
limited comparison of the generosity of financial support for children, as we 
have not controlled in any way for the costs of children, nor have we 
considered the distribution of income for families with children in each country 
(to evaluate our conclusions above more precisely, one would need to compare 
both absolute PPP-adjusted income levels and percentiles of the income 
distribution across countries, to match points in the income distributions). 
 
  To begin to address the issue of benchmarking the generosity of each 
system to the redistribution going on in the system more generally, Figure 4 
shows the series graphed in Figures 1 & 2 expressed as a fraction of the post-
transfer income received by an otherwise-identical family without children (we 
have shown a few cases: many other permutations could have been considered, 
particularly the UK in 1997 when the amount of means-tested support for 
children varied considerably with the age of the child). Figures 5 and 6 shows 
the extra payments for each child as a fraction of the payments for a family 
without that child. The interpretation is, for example, that at a pre-transfer 
income of zero, a couple with 1 child receives 55% more post-transfer income 
than a couple with no children, and we refer to this as the “implicit equivalence 
scale” in the transfer system. There are two striking features. The first is that 
the US appears to be more generous to children than the UK at very low 
incomes, providing over 2.5 times as much disposable income to families with 
children than to those without. We are, however, measuring support for 
children relative to the support provided to adults alone: as Figures 1-3 together 
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children as the UK, but it provides far less to adults without children than the 
UK, so the correct conclusion is that the generosity of the US’ support for 
children relative to adults is greater than the UK’s (although, at this point, we 
have still not controlled for variation in the costs of children between the US 
and the UK). The second point is the dramatic spike in support for children in 
the UK at low incomes: a single person with a pre-transfer income between 
£3,000 and £5,000 would see their disposable income rise by over 150% if they 
had a child. This result looks extremely surprising, and is due to the fact that 
people without children cannot claim an in-work tax credit. Of course, very few 
families without children have such low pre-transfer incomes compared to 
families with children.  
 
[Figures 4-6 about here] 
 
  Figures 1-6 have all been drawn for specific family-types, and are good 
representations of the structure of the transfer system. Using the Institute for 
Fiscal Studies’ model of the tax and benefit system in the UK, we can calculate 
the increase in net income that each family received for its children compared 
to the net income that the family would have received without the children 
(excluding behavioural responses of course). These calculations are made for 
each household in the Family Resources Survey – a representative sample of 
UK households – and are then grossed up to the UK population. For this 
exercise we continue to assume full take-up of all programmes to calculate 
these ratios, and that pre-transfer incomes and housing costs are  exogenous, 
but we are able to take into account covariates other than pre-transfer income 
and the number of children. In practice, net transfers to families with or without 
children may depend upon characteristics such as the ages of children and 
adults, the distribution of earnings within a family, childcare costs, tenure and 
housing costs, and disability, and accounting for all of these gives a more 
accurate picture than Figure 2 & 3. 
9 Figures 7 & 8 show the empirical 
counterparts to Figures 2 and 4 in the UK. As we would expect, there is a 
strong – but not perfect – correspondence between the two.
10  
                                                       
9 Housing subsidies and support for childcare could both be very significant ways 
of directing support to children if, for example, having a child makes it more likely 
that one receives subsidised public housing or housing support, or if childcare 
support is particularly generous and at least some aspects of childcare are a 
consumption good rather than an unavoidable cost of working. 
10 The main reason for the differences is that the position of the spike in the implicit  
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[Figures 7 & 8 about here] 
 
 
IV. COMPARING THE GENEROSITY OF THE US AND UK 
SYSTEMS 
 
The analysis in the previous section has set out how the US and UK systems 
differ in payments to children, expressed both in absolute terms and in respect 
to the payments given to an equivalent household without children. As 
discussed above, two remaining possibilities need to be controlled for: the  
costs of children may differ, or the distribution of incomes may differ such that 
the figures above are misleading. In this section we control for both factors. We 
consider three possible ways of incorporating the costs of children into our 
calculations — firstly by using the official scales in each country, second by 
using scales calculated using comparable (Engel) methodology in each country, 
and finally, to assess robustness to the first two, we also use exactly the same 
scale in both countries. 
 
To begin with, we graphically compare the generosity of the transfer systems 
with our estimated Engel equivalence scale (since this does not have an age-
related component and is thus directly comparable to our figures). Figure 9 
superimposes our estimated equivalence scales onto the series shown in Figure 
4.  At lower incomes, implicit support exceeds the estimated Engel equivalence 
scales, and at higher incomes, implicit support is lower than the estimated 
equivalence scales (we call this “under-compensation” and discuss the 
interpretation in Section V): the lines cross at around £10,600 and £9,000 in 
                                                                                                                           
equivalence scale line depends on the hourly wage of workers in the household, and 
hence the line itself is not in the same place for all households. Other differences 
are that our full tax and benefit model also takes into account the following: 
Housing Benefit, which reduces the absolute and relative support for children; 
support for childcare and free school meals, which increases the absolute and 
relative support for children; the age of adults and children, which can sometimes 
affect the absolute and relative support, and the hours rule in WFTC, which means 
that some families are not entitled to the WFTC at the incomes that we assumed 
because they do not meet the 16 hours rule, reducing the relative support for 
children. But the absolute level of child support in Figure 8 is £2.89/week less 
(average) than that implied by Figures 1 & 2, so the differences in Figure 7 are 
more likely to come from differences in the post-transfer income that does not vary 
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the UK for couples with 1 or 2 children respectively ($13,000 or $9,500 in the 
US): in other words, the transfer system is achieving horizontal equity only for 
families with 2 children and pre-transfer incomes of less than £9,000.  
 
[Figure 9 about here] 
 
This comparison shows us the income levels at which the transfer systems 
either over- or under-compensate families for their children, but it does not 
show us how many families are receiving too much or too little for their 
children , or the average amount of under- or over-compensation. To do this, 
we need to integrate the series in Figure 9 across the pre-transfer income 
distribution for families with children. One attractive method would be to 
estimate the income distribution non-parametrically and then construct the 
weighted sum of implicit equivalence scales using the income densities as 
weights. In what follows here, however, we simply use the (weighted) 
empirical distribution from our survey and calculate summary statistics over 
that sample. Specifically, for each family in our dataset (families with 1 or 2 
adults and 3 or fewer children), we assign them a calculated implicit 
equivalence scale, based on their pre-transfer income and the number of 
children.
11 These results are presented in Tables 4 and 5 for the UK, and 6 and 
7 for the US. Tables 4 and 6 break the analysis down by the number of adults 
and children, and Tables 5 and 7 use income quartile and the number of adults. 
As we would prefer our computations to be unaffected by the relative weight of 
single adults and couple families, we have conditioned all of our equivalence 
scales on the number of adults (i.e. families with no children have a weight of 
1). This means that the numbers for lone parents are not directly comparable to 
couples: we do this to avoid having to come to a view on the relative weight of 
single adults and two-adult families.  
 
                                                       
11 We use the Family Resources Survey  in the UK and the Consumer Expenditure 
Survey in the US to estimate the pre-transfer income distribution. Ideally, we need 
a definition of income that corresponds as closely as possible to that used by  the 
transfer systems, but these income definitions vary between transfer programmes 
even within countries. For simplicity, we choose a definition in the US that includes 
earnings, investment income and pension income. In the UK, our definition 
includes all private income. In the UK, we assume all dependent children are under 
16.   
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The results are in line with Figure 9: in both countries, and for both lone 
parents and couples, the implicit equivalence scales increase with the number 
of children and decrease markedly with income. One interesting point is the 
relative heterogeneity in the implicit equivalence scales amongst lone parents 
and couples with more than 2 children in the US, as shown by the difference 
between the mean and median implicit equivalence scale (for example, lone 
parents with 1 child have a mean implicit equivalence scale of 1.781 but the 
median is 1.243). This heterogeneity is due to the relatively high payments for 
children at low pre-transfer incomes. The distribution of implicit equivalence 
scales in the UK, though, shows more homogeneity.  
 
  The first 2 rows in Tables 4-7 (labelled “Implicit equivalences scales” ) 
use only information on pre-transfer income and family composition to 
calculate the implicit equivalence scale, but, as Figure 7 showed, support for 
children depends on other characteristics. A full tax and benefit model 
operating on a representative sample of families with children allows us to go 
further, and so, for the UK, we show a measure of the implicit equivalence 
scale that has been defined for each household in our sample using a tax and 
benefit model (as shown in Figure 7). The implicit equivalence scales are 
slightly lower, for reasons discussed in endnote 10.  
 
  We now compare these implicit equivalence scales to three equivalence 
scales: the official scales in each country, scales calculated using a comparable 
(Engel) methodology in each country, and the same scale in both countries as a 
baseline across the two countries, thus controlling for the possibility that it is 
observed differences in equivalence scales (about which we know there are 
measurement problems) that is generating these differences. For simplicity we 
take the scale recommended in Citro and Michael (1995), given by E = (A + 
0.7K)
0.7 where A is the number of adults and K is the number of children, 
which allows a degree of economies of scale and a broad difference in the 
relative costs of children versus adults, but no age adjustment  (referred to as 
the CM scale hereafter). The tables show the mean value of these three 
equivalence scales by the number of adults and the number of children, and the 
number of adults and income quartile (as none of these scales depend upon 
income, the slight variation by income quartile reflects the correlation between 
family size and pre-transfer income). For reasons discussed in endnote 4, our 
estimated Engel scale puts a higher weight on children relative to adults than 
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  In the UK, the mean implicit equivalence scale exceeds the McClements 
scale and CM scale for lone parents, but is less than all three comparison scales 
for couples. By income quartile, only the mean implicit equivalence scale for 
families in the bottom income quartile exceeds the three comparison 
equivalence scales. In the US, the mean implicit equivalence scale by number 
of children exceeds the Orshansky scale and CM scale for lone parents, but is 
either lower or marginally higher than all three scales for couple families. By 
income quartile, the result is the same as the UK: over-compensation only 
occurs in the bottom income quartile.  
 
  Comparing these results across countries a couple of patterns emerge. For 
couples, the US system appears more generous than the UK in the sense in 
which we are interested. This is true when considering either mean implicit 
equivalence scales, mean differences between implicit scales and equivalence 
scales (of whatever form) or the proportion of households who are being over-
compensated. For lone parents, however, the picture is more complicated. It is 
certainly true that mean implicit equivalence scales are higher in the US than in 
the UK. But this reflects the fact, discussed in more detail below, that a number 
of US households have extremely high implicit scales, presumably as a result 
of having a low counterfactual income in the case where they did not have 
children. At the median, however, the UK appears more generous to single 
parents with children and this is reflected in the fact that the proportion of 
single parents who are overcompensated is higher in the UK for two of our 
three equivalence scale measures. 
 
  The percentage of families of each type who are over-compensated (i.e. 
who have an implicit equivalence scale in excess of the other scales) also helps 
to illustrate the heterogeneity of implicit equivalence scales within the two 
benefit systems. For example, in the UK and the US, the Engel scale is the 
highest of the three comparison scales, and so fewer families have an implicit 
scale higher than the Engel scale than the other two scales.  
 
  But the difference between the scales is much more dramatic in the UK 
than the US. For example, 73% of lone parents with 1 child in the UK have an 
implicit equivalence scale that exceeds the McClements scale, but only 8% 
exceed our Engel equivalence scale. Amongst all lone parents in the bottom 
quartile, the corresponding percentages are 99% and 9%. In the US, the 
percentage of families whose implicit equivalence scale exceeds a comparison  
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scale varies much less by the choice of comparison scale, even though our 
Engel scales in the US are just as high (relative to the other two scales) as they 
are in the UK (for example, 46% of lone parents with 1 child in the US have an 
implicit equivalence scale that exceeds the Orshansky scale, and 30% exceed 
our Engel equivalence scale). The interpretation here is that the distribution of 
implicit equivalence scales is more compressed in the UK than it is in the US 
(at least around the values corresponding to our equivalence scales), and 
particularly so for lone parents. 
 
  The other striking feature of the bottom three rows in Tables 4 and 6 is the 
similarity between the results for the official equivalence scales and our 
benchmark scale. Despite differences in the mean values by family type, the 
percentage of families whose implicit equivalence scale exceeds these 2 
comparison scales is remarkably similar. (For couples, there is little difference 
in  the proportion of families who are over-compensated between all three 
scales, even though the Engel scale is substantially higher than the official and 
the CM scale).  
 
  What is clear is that, in both the US and the UK, single adults with 
children are more likely to be treated more generously than simple 
redistribution would imply, than are couple families. On the other hand, in the 
UK, couples with children receive slightly less than the official scales would 
imply, whereas in the US, payments are roughly in keeping with the relativities 
underlying the Orshansky scale. In both countries, families in the bottom 
quartile tend to be over-compensated, and better-off families are likely to be 
under-compensated, in line with what one would expect if for efficiency 
reasons we want to raise child-related payments to a minimum level but not 
necessarily beyond. On some comparisons, the US looks more generous than 
the UK, particularly for low-income lone parents, but this is in part because of 




IV.1 An alternative comparison 
 
Another way of approaching the problem is to see what sort of equivalence 
scale is suggested by the structure of support for children (this approach has 
been used by Banks and Johnson, 1994 and Coulter et al, 1992, as well as 
Betson and Michael, 1993, cited in Citro and Michael, 1995). Rather than 





        -page 21 
method directly to the data generated from our tax-benefit modelling exercise. 
In particular, we specify a general equivalence scale as: 
 
E = (A + η K) 
θ  
 
where A is the number of adults and K is the number of children in the 
households as above. The two parameters θ  and η  determine the economies of 
scale in the household and the weight given to children compared to adults 
respectively. Given data on A and K, as well as the implicit equivalence scale 
for each household, calculated as described above, we can find the values of η  
and θ  that most closely correspond to the implicit equivalence scale (based on 
sum of squared deviations). Table 8 contains the results of this procedure in the 
US and UK. Our results show that the two official equivalence scales 
correspond closely to the square root equivalence scale (where household 
income is divided by the square root of households size, children counting as 
adults). Neither our estimated Engel equivalence scales nor the implicit 
equivalence scales show any economies of scale, but they do give children a 
lower weight than adults. As would be expected given the earlier results, the 
implicit equivalence scales give children a lower weight than the estimated 
Engel equivalence scales, and the US appears more generous than the UK, at 
least at the means, although we do not pursue these further here.  
 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS  
 
In this paper we have discussed ways of evaluating the generosity of financial 
support for families with children. Our starting point has been that there are 
two reasons to give support to such families, and that a separation of these two 
dimensions can enhance a comparative exercise, whether one is comparing  
two countries or the same country in two different periods. On the one hand, 
families with children are often poor, particularly relative to their needs, and 
hence will benefit from support purely on redistributive grounds. On the other 
hand, governments may want to give financial support to children purely 
because of the idea that the issue of children living in poor families is somehow 
more important to address than the issue of poor families alone. The separation 
of these two dimensions requires one to take a stance on how much of transfers 
capture pure redistribution (regardless of whether to a child or to an adult) and  
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we argue that this concept, although not without its problems, is best captured 
with an equivalence scale. 
 
  Throughout our analysis, we have demonstrated the issues by using a 
detailed comparison of the US and UK systems. Both have similar structures, 
using a combination of means-tested benefits and tax credits to give financial 
support to households with children. On the surface the two systems look 
similar in their generosity – in dollar terms, the benefits received by a family 
with children at a similar (PPP adjusted) income are comparable. When one 
compares the ratios of payments received by families with and without 
children, holding other factors constant,  differences emerge. This is a result of 
the fact that, since the US gives less support to childless households than does 
the UK, the implied generosity of the US system for children relative to adults 
for some household types is greater. Broadly speaking, this result holds for 
households of different compositions and incomes, although the effects are 
strongest at the bottom of the income distribution and also for couples. 
Intuitively speaking, the US system redistributes less, and hence equal-sized 
dollar transfers to households with children are more “generous” when assessed 
against the stance of the system as a whole. 
 
  Although we feel that our analysis adds an important dimension to 
comparative exercise, it is not without its problems. For a start, the analysis 
relies on the policy analyst’s knowledge of the equivalence scales that capture 
households’ variation in needs. We have shown, however, that the broad 
conclusions of our comparison are unaffected by this issue, at least over the 
range of scales that we have employed here. When comparison regimes differ 
by less, however, this is less likely to be the case, and choice of equivalence 
scale will become an important issue.  
 
  More importantly perhaps, there are three ways in which our analysis is  
not the end of the story. Firstly, even conditional on the equivalence scale, our 
comparisons assume that the redistributive stance of the transfer system can be 
accurately picked up from payments to childless households, in the sense that 
such payments form the denominator of our implicit equivalence scale; we 
could equally well have presented an analysis of how support for adults relative 
to children compares to the cost of adults relative to children.
12 Secondly, our 
                                                       
12 It could be argued, since both the US and the UK have stressed the need to 
reduce child poverty, and since both have reformed the structures and level of 
support for children in recent years, that payments to families with children would 
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methodology (or at least that part that considers summary statistics instead of 
graphical analysis) considers information from all households, whereas one 
may think it more reasonable to limit the analysis to those households some 
bottom fraction of the income distribution. Finally, as we pointed out earlier, 
there are ways of supporting children other than financial transfers in the form 
of benefit payments, and these are not accounted for in our comparisons. It is 
clear that whilst the above concerns are important to bear in mind, we argue 
that they do not invalidate the comparisons. Note also that their importance will 
depend on the nature of the comparison itself. If, for example, one was 
comparing two potential policy proposals for reform in the same country, these 
issues would be considerably less relevant. 
 
  On balance, we argue that there is more to generosity than mere dollar 
payments. While the magnitude of payments to families with children is surely 
an important issue (and particularly so at the bottom end of the income 
distribution) it seems that at least one dimension of generosity should be the 
payments to children that one would make over and above what one would 
make to an equally-poor adult. We have pointed out that there are a number of 
reasons why governments might want to make such payments, and have shown 
that there are a number of households who do indeed receive such payments 
and that such households are concentrated at the bottom of the income 
distribution. However, to assert that all child-related welfare payments fulfil 
this role is to neglect the fact that governments redistribute  to poor individuals 
in general. Stripping out such redistributions does not result in an unambiguous 
comparison of welfare or benefit systems, but does enhance our understanding 
of the nature of government support for children, and in particular, does so in a 
dimension that more closely corresponds to much of the rhetoric relating to 
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Appendix A 
Transfer programmes for families with children in the UK and the US 
 
Our aim here is to summarise the most important transfer programmes for 
families with children in the UK and the US, and where they differ from those 
available to families without children. More detailed descriptions can be found 
in: Battle and Mendelson (2001) and Brewer (2001), which survey both 
countries; Ellwood and Liebman (2000), which looks at the US tax system; 
Brewer, Myck and Reed (2001) and Brewer and Gregg (2001), which look at 
the UK. In-kind subsidies in the US such as childcare support, Medicaid and 
housing assistance in the US are reviewed in Blau (2000), Gruber (2001), and 




Families with children in the US can potentially receive financial support from 
Food Stamps, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), the Earned 
Income Tax Credit (EITC), and through the income tax system. 
 
  Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) is the main welfare 
programme in the US. It provides income support to low-income families with 
children in and out of work.  States have discretion over welfare policy under 
the TANF block grant, but in return have to meet key targets on employment of 
welfare recipients, getting 40% into work by 2000, and 50% by 2002 (A full 
discussion of  the history of TANF and AFDC can also be found in Meyer and 
Rosenbaum, 2000, Blank et al, 2000, and Committee on Ways and Means, 
2000). They are also prohibited from using federal funds to pay TANF to 
families for more than 60 months. The flexibility makes it difficult to 
characterise the transfer system facing a typical low-income family in the US. 
But most states provide a maximum credit to low-income families with 
children depending on household composition, subject to resource limits, time 
limits and work or job-search requirements. The credit is then tapered away as 
income rises, perhaps after an initial disregard. People without children cannot 
claim TANF: some states run their own schemes providing emergency or 
temporary assistance to these people, which come under the name of General 
Assistance programmes. 
 
  Food Stamps are available to low-income families with or without 
children, in and out of work, subject to resource constraints and job-search or 
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on household composition tapered away as incomes rise, after allowances for 
housing and caring costs. 47% of Food Stamps are now paid electronically (and 
all will be paid electronically by 2002) making them very similar to traditional 
income support programs. The Food Stamps program is widely seen as a pure 
financial benefit as there is consensus that the value of the programme to a 
family is less than their total food budget.    
 
  Low-income families with and without children can apply for the Earned 
Income Tax Credit (EITC). It is a refundable tax credit, so EITC awards in 
excess of income tax liability are paid direct to the taxpayer (a non-refundable 
tax credit, by contrast,  merely reduces tax liabilities to some non-negative 
amount, and so is worth more to well-off families than those paying little tax). 
Eligibility depends upon earned income, unearned income and the number of 
qualifying children. Couples are assessed jointly. The only work condition is 
that the taxpayer (either taxpayer in a couple) had positive earned income. 
There are three regions in the credit schedule. In the phase-in region, the credit 
is equal to a percentage of income until the credit equals the maximum amount. 
There is then a flat region where the maximum credit is received. In the phase-
out region, the credit is tapered away to zero.  
 
  Families may also have to pay federal income taxes and payroll taxes. 
The presence of children can have three effects on income tax liabilities. First, 
a parent can claim an extra allowance for each dependent, although this is 
gradually tapered away from very high income families. Second, families with 
any children can claim a $500 partially-refundable Child Tax Credit. Third, a 
single person or unmarried couple with children can choose to file as a Head of 
Household, which reduces tax liabilities at all incomes, bringing similar 
benefits to filing as a married couple.  
 
What do we not consider.  There are a number of transfer programmes that we 
do not consider. Families in the US may also have to pay state income taxes, 
and may be entitled to state Earned Income Credits (as of June 2000, 14 States 
did so, though neither Florida or California, with two of the three states with 
the highest federal EITC caseloads, have yet introduced a state EITC – see 
Johnson, 1999, and Johnson, 2000). There are a number of childcare 
programmes operating at the federal level in the US. The two most important 
are the Child Care and Development Fund, and the Dependent Care Tax Credit  
 
 
              - page 30 -   
(CCDF and DCTC). The Medicaid programme and federal housing support 
also provide important in-kind transfers; other smaller programmes provide 
assistance for low-income families including: school lunch programs, 
supplemental food program for women, infants and children, energy assistance, 
Head Start and various training programmes: these are not considered further in 
this paper.  We also ignore support for education costs through the tax system.  
The UK  
From April 2001, families with children in the UK can potentially receive 
financial support from means-tested and non-means-tested benefits, and 
through the income tax system.  
 
There are four key programmes. First, Child Benefit – a flat-rate, non-
means-tested, non-taxable benefit for each child –provides the core of financial 
support for children.  
 
Out-of-work families with or without children may be able to claim a 
means-tested benefit (either Income Support (IS) or income-related Jobseeker’s 
Allowance (JSA(IB))). IS and JSA(IB) are worth the same for equivalent 
families, but JSA(IB) imposes job search requirements and must be claimed by 
able-bodied people without children and couples with children. Both depend 
on household composition with extra child allowances for each child and a 
family premium for a family with any children. They have an earnings 
disregard of £10 (£20) a week for two-parent families (lone parents) followed 
by a 100% withdrawal rate.  
 
Low-income families with children or disabilities where one adult works 
16 hours or more a week may claim an in-work benefit: either the Working 
Families’ Tax Credit (WFTC) or the Disabled Person’s Tax Credit. The WFTC 
is the third in the continual evolution to in-work support with families with 
children in the UK, replacing Family Credit in 1999, which itself replaced the 
Family Income Supplement in 1988. The amount of credit depends upon 
earnings, hours worked, and the number of qualifying children. Couples are 
assessed jointly. There are two regions in the credit schedule. The basic credit 
is worth £106 a week to a family with two children (April 2001 figure). 
Beyond an after-tax income of £92.90 a week, the credit is tapered away at 
55%, with a small extra credit for families where someone works more than 30 
hours a week. The credit is fully tapered away for a family with two children at 
a pre-transfer income of around £400 a week. From 2003, there will be a 
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children. 
 
The UK has an individual system of income tax.  Credits and allowances 
appear in a person’s tax schedule.  Allowances are typically less generous than 
in the US, so people start paying income tax at lower annual incomes (see Gale, 
1997, and Brewer, 2001, for more comparisons of the US and UK tax systems). 
The new Children’s Tax Credit is a non-refundable tax credit worth up to £520 
a year regardless of the number of children. It replaces two mutually-exclusive 
and equal-valued tax credits: the Married Couple’s Allowance (MCA) and the 
Additional Person’s Allowance (APA), both abolished in April 2000.  The 
combined impact is that, since 1999, married couples without children have 
lost a tax break, and families with children, regardless of their marital status, 
have seen a tax break more than double in value. The MCA and APA were 
available to all taxpayers, but the Children’s Tax Credit is withdrawn at 6.7 
percent from people paying higher-rates of income tax (over £33,935 from 
April 2001), like the Child Tax Credit in the US. From 2002, the Children’s 
Tax Credit will be worth up to £1040 in the first year of a child’s life.  
 
Table A.1. shows how many families may benefit from each strand of 
support. But these four systems overlap. For example, all families with children 
can receive child benefit alongside one or more of income support, WFTC and 
the children’s tax credit. WFTC and income support are nearly mutually 
exclusive because of the conditions on the number of hours worked, but some 
families in transition from having some adults in work to having no adults in 
work could temporarily receive both income support and WFTC. Almost no 
family would receive income support and benefit from the children’s tax credit 
at the same time. Families receiving WFTC will generally also benefit from the 
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Table A.1. Families receiving financial support for children, 1999–2000 
  Number of families  Number of children 
Child benefit  7,025,000  12,700,000 




WFTC 989,000  2,010,000 
Children’s tax credit  about 5 million  about 8 million 
Notes: CB, IS and JSA estimates are for Great Britain, WFTC and CTC for the UK. 
JSA and WFTC estimates relate to February 2000. 
Sources: Brewer, Myck and Reed (2001). 
 
  The relative complexity of these schemes is one of the reasons behind the 
UK Government’s proposal to pull together all of the financial support for 
children that is currently paid through welfare payments, in-work benefits and 
tax credits into a single instrument, with the same rules and administration 
applying to all families (this is drawn from Brewer and Gregg, 2001; Brewer, 
Clark and Myck, 2001, contains a much longer discussion. Few concrete 
details of how it would work have been released at the time of writing, except 
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  This integrated child credit will have a number of new features that give it 
many more similarities with the Canadian Child Tax Benefit than the US 
system.. First, all payments will be paid to the main care-giver (under the 
current system, this depends on which benefit is being paid and even how the 
payment is being paid). Second, income uncertainty at the time of transitions 
into and out of work will be reduced, as the integrated child credit will not 
depend on the family’s work status, providing  “a seamless payment across the 
welfare to work divide” (HM Treasury, 2000) rather than the uncertainly and 
possible delay of moving from out-of-work benefits to in-work benefits in the 
current system. Third, payments will be assessed against family income 
throughout, presumably on a constant definition of income. This represents the 
most significant step towards joint assessment for families with children since 
income tax became individualized in 1990. The way it responds to changes in 
income and circumstances—much of which remains undecided at the time of 
writing—will also be crucial. In terms of structure of payments, the 
combination of child benefit and the integrated child credit will preserve the 
substantial bias towards the first child in the UK’s system, and mean that 
lower-income families will receive more for each child than better off families.  
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At the same time as the integrated child credit is introduced, support for low-
income working families will be extended to the able-bodied working-age 
without children, through a general employment tax credit. 
 
What do we not consider: Families with children on means-tested benefits are 
entitled to a lump-sum payment (the maternity grant) on the birth of a child. In 
recent years, this has increased dramatically in importance. In addition, low-
income households with and without children can receive help with rental 
housing costs through Housing Benefit (HB), and help for the local tax in the 
UK (through Council Tax Benefit). Of less importance are the limited help 
with mortgage interest payments for families with and without children on out-
of-work benefits, and in-kind health benefits (these are of considerably less 
value than Medicaid as most health-care is provided free to all) and free school 
meals to low-income and out-of-work families with children respectively. We 
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Source: Authors' calculations. Assumes one-earner couple and 1 child under 16. Ignores support for housing and childcare.  
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Figure 4. The equivalence scale implicit for couples with children in the 



























































1 kid, UK 2 kids, UK
1 kid, US 2 kids, US
 
Source: Authors' calculations. Assumes one-earner couple and children under 16. Ignores support for housing and childcare.   
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Source: Authors' calculations. Assumes one-earner couple and children under 16. Ignores support for housing and childcare.  
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Figure 7. The empirical implicit equivalence scale for couples with 



















































Source: Authors’ calculations using TAXBEN based on data from the 1997-
8 FRS (income measure is weekly £).  
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Figure 8. Support for children implicit for couples with children in the 











































Source: Authors’ calculations using TAXBEN based on data from the 1997-
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Equivalence scale, 1 kid
Equivalence scale, 2 kids
 





















































Equivalence scale, 1 kid
Equivalence scale, 2 kids
 
Source: Authors' calculations. Assumes one-earner couple and children under 16. Ignores support for housing and childcare. 
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Tables in main text 
 
Table 1. The McClements equivalence scale 
  Single adult  Couple family 












No  children  0.610 1.000 1.000  1.640 
Child aged 0–1  0.090  0.148  0.090  0.148 
Child aged 2–4  0.180  0.295  0.180  0.295 
Child aged 5–7  0.210  0.344  0.210  0.344 
Child aged 8–10  0.230  0.377  0.230  0.377 
Child aged 11–12  0.250  0.410  0.250  0.410 
Child aged 13–15  0.270  0.443  0.270  0.443 
Child aged 16 or over  0.360  0.590  0.360  0.590 
Spouse  0.390 0.640 0.420  0.640 
Other  adults  0.360 0.590 0.360  0.590 
Source: Authors’ calculations from the Before Housing Costs scale in DSS, 
2000, Appendix 4.  
 
Table 2. The equivalence scales implicit in the Orshanky poverty 
measure 
 Single  adult  Couple  family 
 












No children   0.777  1.000  1.000  1.287 
First  child  0.252 0.325 0.202  0.259 
Second child  0.174  0.224  0.312 0.402 
Third  child  0.317 0.407 0.268  0.524 
Fourth  child  0.235 0.303 0.213  0.674 






        -page 43 
Table 3. Estimated Engel equivalence scales 
 UK  US 
Lone parents     
1 child  1.881 1.733 
2 children  2.434 3.330   
3 children  3.362 3.468 
Couples    
1 child  1.326 1.390 
2 children  1.700 1.795 
3 children  1.893 2.202 
Notes: see text for details. Full regression results available from the authors. 
Both scales are estimated under the assumption that a family with no 
children has a weight of 1.  
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Table 4. Comparisons of implicit and other equivalence scales by 
family type, UK. 
  1 adult  2 adults 




            
mean  1.603 2.026 2.527 1.894  1.159  1.239  1.434  1.234 




            
mean  1.342 1.590 1.879 1.510  1.090  1.456  1.278  1.153 
median 
 








1.881 2.432 3.362 2.295  1.326  1.700  1.893  1.599 
E = (A + 
0.7K)
0.7 
1.450 1.846 2.208 1.705  1.234  1.450  1.653  1.407 
              
% with positive difference 
between implicit equivalence scale 
          
McClements  73 78 85 77  23  20  26  22 
Engel    8 5 1 6 20  16 23  18 
E = (A + 
0.7K)
0.7 
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Table 5. Comparisons of implicit and other equivalence scales by 
family type and income quartile, UK.  
Quartiles 1st  2nd 3
rd 4
th 
Adults  1  2  1 2 1 2 1 2 
Implicit equivalence scale 
 
      
mean  2.140  1.798  1.440 1.257 1.054 1.054 1.035 1.034 
median  2.176  1.823  1.336 1.148 1.045 1.054 1.030 1.040 
Implicit equivalence scale using 
TAXBEN 
      
mean  1.629  1.572  1.317 1.211 1.060 1.060 1.030 1.034 
median 
 
1.561  1.480  1.231 1.128 1.047 1.059 1.029 1.032 




2.335  1.625  2.194 1.589 2.245 1.597 2.187 1.601 
E = (A + 
0.7K)
0.7 
1.726  1.428  1.654 1.401 1.672 1.404 1.624 1.405 
          
% with positive difference between 
implicit equivalence scale 
     
McClements  99 100 35 27 1  0  0  0 
Engel    9 100 0 15 0 0 0 0 
E = (A + 
0.7K)
0.7 
99 100 28 24 0  0  0  0 
Notes to both tables: Authors’ calculations based on FRS 1997-8. Families 
with children with incomes over £1,000 a week have been assumed to have 
incomes of £1,000. Quartiles are of gross income distribution for families 
with children with less than 4 children. See text for further details.  
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Table 6. Comparisons of implicit and other equivalence scales by 
family type, US. 
  1 adult  2 adults 




            
mean  1.781 2.226 3.305 2.179  1.370  1.503  1.746  1.495 




            
mean  n/a n/a n/a n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a 
median 
 








1.733 3.330 3.468 2.593  1.390  1.800  2.202  1.708 
E = (A + 
0.7K)
0.7 
1.450 1.846 2.208 1.710  1.234  1.450  1.653  1.401 
              
% with positive difference 
between implicit equivalence scale 
          
Orshansky  46 50 63 50  31  25  27  28 
Engel    30 25 41 30  25  21  23  23 
E = (A + 
0.7K)
0.7 







        -page 47 
Table 7. Comparisons of implicit and other equivalence scales by 
family type and income quartile, US. 
Quartiles 1st  2nd 3
rd 4
th 
Adults  1  2  1 2 1 2 1 2 
Implicit equivalence scale 
 
      
mean  3.640  2.908  1.339 1.288 1.083 1.048 1.075 1.031 
median  3.438  3.144  1.275 1.230 1.082 1.044 1.070 1.025 
Implicit equivalence scale using 
TAXBEN 
      
mean  n/a  n/a  n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
median 
 








2.702  1.709  2.504 1.705 2.548 1.721 2.664 1.700 
E = (A + 
0.7K)
0.7 
1.756  1.401  1.679 1.400 1.664 1.408 1.752 1.396 
          
% with positive difference between 
implicit equivalence scale 
     
Orshansky  100  100 27 30 0  0  0  0 
Engel    77  100 0 5 0 0 0 0 
E = (A + 
0.7K)
0.7 
100  100 6 30  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Notes to both tables: Authors’ calculations based on CEX 1998-9. Families 
with children with incomes over $2000 a week have been assumed to have 
incomes of $2000. See text for further details. Quartiles are of gross income 
distribution for families with children with less than 4 children.  
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Table 8.  
Regimes  η   θ  
Implicit equivalence scale, UK  0.24  1 
Implicit equivalence scale, US  0.61  1 
    
Estimated equivalence scale, UK  0.72  1 
Estimated equivalence scale, US  0.88  1 
    
McClements equivalence scale (UK)  1  0.49 
Orshansky equivalence scale  (US)  1  0.53 
Notes: parameters estimated to minimise sum of squared deviations of stated 
regime and estimated equivalence scale or E = (A + η K) 
θ  . Uses FRS 1997-8 
or CEX 1998. Sample is families with 1 or 2 adults and 1, 2 or 3 children. See 
text for details.  
 